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Shareholder primacy is increasingly considered as the most 
effective way to foster managerial (corporate) accountability. 
Contrary to this now standard argument, we consider that 
shareholder primacy, rather than gatekeeper failure, is directly 
responsible for the multiplication of accounting irregularities and 
the dramatic increase in executive compensations. To defend this 
thesis, we propose a new reading of Berle and Means (1932), 
Galbraith (1973) and Alchian and Demsetz (1972), stressing the 
logical failure of a control of the business firm provided for by 
stock markets: the implementation of shareholder primacy 
implies a partial disconnection between access to internal 
knowledge and empowerment. In turn, this disconnection favours 
deceptive behaviours on the part of corporate insiders. Empirical 
evidence mostly based on Enron-era financial scandals illustrates 
our argument. 
Keywords: shareholder primacy; managerial accountability; theory 
of the firm 
 
JEL classification: D23, G30, L20 
 
Antoine Rebérioux 
Maître de conférences 
EconomiX, Université Paris X - Nanterre 
Maison Max Weber, bât. K 
200 avenue de la République 
92 000 Nanterre, France 
 
 
 
  
ii
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY 
AND MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
Antoine Rebérioux1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
By the end of the year 2000, the doctrine of shareholder primacy 
seemed to be unchallengeable. It was winning ground in business 
circles, while most economic and legal scholars depicted it as an 
efficient corporate governance mode. Besides, the jurisdiction the 
most receptive to this model, the U.S.A., exhibited exceptional 
economic performances, at the peak of the so-called ‘New 
Economy’. In continental Europe, the growing activity of financial 
markets together with the rise to power of foreign institutional 
investors were not favourable to the traditional model of the 
corporation, where shareholders’ interest is only one among 
others. As Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) provocatively stated: 
‘Since the dominant corporate ideology of shareholder primacy is 
unlikely to be undone, its success represents the ‘end of history’ 
for corporate law’ (p.89). 
This doctrine is traditionally grounded in two different ways. 
From a legal point of view, it is possible to consider that 
stockholders are the owners of the corporation. In this case, 
shareholder primacy fully protects private ownership, the 
cornerstone of a free market economy. From an economic point of 
view, one may argue that shareholders, as residual claimants, are 
the only risk-bearers in the firm; therefore, they need to be in 
control (see e.g. Easterbrook and Fischel, 1993). Yet it is now 
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widely recognized that none of these claims is convincing (Stout, 
2002). Most corporate lawyers admit that shareholders in widely-
held companies own their shares, which grants them numerous 
rights (for example, the right to vote in general assemblies on 
proposals included in the proxy statement). But they do not own 
the company, as a legal entity, nor the firm as an economic 
(productive) entity. Concerning the economic argument, 
Williamson (1985), Blair (1995) or Zingales (1998) convincingly 
stated that, when contracts are incomplete, non-shareholder 
constituencies—and in particular workers investing in specific 
human capital—do bear risk. 
However, the proponents of shareholder primacy are increasingly 
putting forward a new justification: shareholder primacy is 
analysed as the most effective way to foster managerial (corporate) 
accountability. The main reason is that it assigns a clear objective 
to managers (the maximisation of the market price of shares), 
together with numerous disciplinary and incentive mechanisms. 
By contrast, a stakeholder approach would dilute managerial 
accountability and lead to a (sub-optimal) ‘politicization’ of the 
board of directors (see e.g. Bainbridge, 1993, Hansmann, 1996 and 
Tirole, 2001).  
In that case, it is striking that the unprecedented series of 
accounting irregularities by leaders of U.S. and (to a lesser extent) 
European stock markets, following the Enron disaster in 
December 2001, did not result in a reconsideration of this 
argument. The standard thesis explaining this major confidence 
crisis in financial markets stresses the failure of the supervisory 
actors, both external (mainly the auditors and the securities 
analysts) and internal (the board of directors). This failure, in turn, 
is explained by the conflicts of interest in these professions, and so 
by an incentive argument. The present article challenges this 
thesis, by considering that the generalisation of shareholder 
primacy as a corporate governance mode is the main driving force 
behind the crisis. As a consequence, the accountability argument 
is reversed: shareholder primacy weakens, rather than strengthens, 
managerial accountability. The intuition behind this point is the 
2007] SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY 3 
 
following: the implementation of shareholder primacy implies a 
partial disconnection between access to internal knowledge and 
empowerment. In turn, this disconnection favours erratic, 
deceptive behaviours on the part of corporate insiders. This 
‘cognitive argument’ therefore completes the ‘incentive argument’ 
in explaining the financial crisis of the Enron-era. 
The article is organized as follows. In section II, the core of the 
shareholder primacy doctrine is portrayed and the standard 
interpretation of the crisis is critically assessed. Section III offers a 
new reading of major authors—namely Berle and Means (1932), 
Galbraith (1973) and Alchian and Demsetz (1972)—who laid the 
theoretical foundations of our cognitive argument. Section IV 
provides empirical evidence in favour of this argument, stressing 
the limits of the supervision by financial market gatekeepers 
during the massive financial scandals of the Enron-era. These 
limits explain the opportunity for managers to extract quasi-rent 
under shareholder primacy. Section V then makes clear how 
deviant behaviours become effective, given the flawed incentives 
provided for by ‘Value Based Management’—the use of 
management tools to measure the creation of shareholder value. 
Section VI concludes. 
II. SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY: FROM THEORY TO 
PRACTICE 
A. THE BASIC FOUNDATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY 
According to the proponents of shareholder primacy, corporate 
governance deals primarily, if not exclusively, with the relations 
between shareholders and managers, and these relations are 
conceived in a strictly hierarchical fashion. The emergence and 
expansion, since the 1960s, of the ‘contractarian’ approach to the 
firm, in economics as well as in legal (corporate law) studies 
(Cheffins, 2004), gave a formal shape to this idea. Prior to the 
1970s, most economic scholars tended to consider the firm as a 
‘black box’, a simple channel between different markets (labour, 
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capital and product markets). Pioneered by Coase (1937), the 
contractarian approach defends, on the contrary, the idea that 
market mechanisms (i.e. voluntary agreements between rational 
agents) are an essential part of intra-firm coordination. Describing 
the firm as ‘a nexus of contracts’, the contractarian approach 
emphasises the incentive (rather than cognitive) aspect of the 
coordination.2 In this framework, managers are considered as the 
‘agents’ of the shareholders, who are the ‘principals’. More 
precisely, the concept of ‘agency relationship’ was introduced in 
corporate governance debates by the Positive Agency Theory 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Borrowed from legal analysis, ‘the agency relation differs from 
other fiduciary relations in that it is the duty of the agent to 
respond to the desires of the principal’ (Reuschlein and Gregory, 
1979, p. 11). Qualifying the relationship between shareholders and 
managers as an agency relationship then entails the belief that it is 
the ‘duty’ of the latter ‘to respond to the desires’ of the former, in 
other words, that the managerial team has been ‘hired’ by the 
shareholders to best serve their interests. 
Yet this doctrine has to cope with one essential characteristic of 
stock markets, at least in the U.S. (or in the U.K.): their liquidity. 
This liquidity induces a dispersion of stock ownership. In turn, 
direct monitoring by shareholders is impeded by the problem of 
collective action: for each shareholder possessing an insignificant 
fraction of the capital, the effort necessary to monitor managers is 
much greater than the expected gain, thus giving rise to free-
riding. As Berle and Means (1932) long ago recognised, the 
managerial team enjoys great freedom and de facto power: ‘[the 
shareholder] power to participate in management has, in large 
measure, been lost to him, and has become vested in the ‘control’’ 
(p. 245). 
                                            
2 For a discussion on this point, see Langlois and Foss (1999). 
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Herein resides a tension, which constitutes the matrix of the 
shareholder primacy doctrine: stockholders are considered as the 
legitimate possessors of power within the firm, but this power is 
supposed to be wrested from them by the corporate executives, 
leading to ‘agency costs’. In other words, shareholder primacy is 
rooted in a philosophy of dispossession. This situation has led to 
an exclusive focus on the question of control: how can the lost 
power be recovered? The answer is by encouraging managers (with 
their potential for misbehaviour) to act in the interests of the 
shareholders and by establishing safety mechanisms capable of 
detecting and curbing managerial misconduct. 
The economic translation of this agency perspective is the 
following: the objective of the managers is reduced to maximising 
the utility of the pool of shareholders. Nevertheless, the 
hypothesis of opportunism, at the heart of the contractarian 
approach, requires analysts to acknowledge that managers will do 
everything in their power to divert value. Shareholders must 
therefore ensure that incentive contracts are signed, in order to 
reduce conflicts of interest to the lowest possible level. Let us 
denote V as the utility function of the group of shareholders, U the 
utility function of the manager, U the manager’s reserve utility, w 
his/her salary, and e(w) = {e+ ; e–} his/her effort (e+ > e–), then the 
firm’s programme can be written as follows: 
tconstrainincentiveewUewU
tconstrainionparticipatUewUtosubject
wVMax
w
);();(
);(
)(
−+
+
≥
≥  
In this model, the firm behaves in an optimal (second best) way 
when it maximizes the well-being of the shareholders. To 
simplify, the stock market price is often used to represent V, as it 
incorporates expected gains in capital and future distributions in 
dividends. Because share prices are primarily perceptions of value, 
managers accountable to shareholders should therefore first and 
foremost influence those perceptions. 
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In this framework, all the mechanisms which favour the 
alignment of managers’ interests with those of the shareholders 
will improve the efficiency of the firm. Corporate executive 
behaviour should, as far as possible, be dependent on stock prices, 
that is to say on the selling and buying decisions of investors. Two 
mechanisms play a decisive role: hostile takeovers (Manne, 1965) 
and share option schemes. In both cases, depreciating share prices 
have damaging consequences for executives (either in terms of 
their careers or in terms of compensation). Yet these mechanisms 
are effective if and only if investors are properly informed about 
the quality of the management. A set of actors might help to 
reduce informational asymmetries between the investors and the 
insiders (the executives). Ultimately, the accuracy of the now 
standard defence of shareholder primacy—as a corporate 
accountability enhancing mechanism—crucially depends on the 
functioning of these actors. These latter may be distinguished 
according to their position vis-à-vis the business firm. The board 
of directors constitutes the main internal supervisory device. 
Following Fama and Jensen (1983), the board is depicted as an 
institution whose function is to reduce agency costs by 
monitoring and ratifying the actions of the managerial team on 
behalf of the shareholders.3 Thus, exclusive control of the board of 
directors by the stockholders constitutes an efficient arrangement. 
This conception emphasises the ‘control’ role of the board at the 
expense of its ‘strategic’ role, as an organ supporting executives in 
their choices (Roberts, McNulty and Stiles, 2005). This has a direct 
consequence: non-executive directors’ independence from the 
management is recognised as a cardinal value, preventing conflicts 
of interest. Outside the firm, (external) auditors, securities 
analysts and ratings agencies (the so-called ‘gatekeepers’) are held 
responsible for verifying the honesty and relevance of financial 
statements as well as for using the information to give the best 
advice possible to investors.  
                                            
3 See also Williamson (1984). 
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For the last twenty years, shareholder primacy has deeply 
influenced the evolution of corporate governance regulations and 
practices in the United States and, to a lesser extent, in the 
European Union. The rights of (minority) stockholders have got 
stronger everywhere, primarily through federal law in the U.S. and 
trans-national law in the E.U. (Cioffi and Cohen, 2000). In 
addition, the activism of institutional investors (mainly pension 
funds) has promoted best practices closely akin to shareholder 
primacy. The growing success of a shareholder value-oriented 
approach to managing a business can be observed on at least three 
levels. First, the presence of independent non-executive directors, 
mostly in the ad hoc committees (audit, nomination and 
remuneration), is now the rule rather than the exception: 
according to Finkelstein and Mooney (2003), outside directors 
accounted for 75 % of directors in 2003 on the average board of 
firms in the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500. Second, stock options 
are increasingly used as a remuneration device for senior 
managers: while they accounted for less than 25% of the average 
S&P500 Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay package at the 
beginning of the 1990s, this part has stabilized to around 50% 
since 1999 (Jensen and Murphy, 2004). Last but not least, ‘Value-
Based Management’ is now a common practice for listed 
companies (Cooper, Crowther, Davies and Davis, 2000; Hossfeld 
and Klee, 2003). To conclude, for most of the commentators, at 
least before December 2001, ‘managerial capitalism’, as described 
by Williamson (1964) or Galbraith (1967), was over. 
B. THE GATEKEEPERS’ FAILURE THESIS 
On 2 December 2001, Enron was placed under bankruptcy 
protection according to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. With 
$63 billion in assets, this has been the largest bankruptcy in U.S. 
history. The various investigations will show that accounting 
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irregularities were systematic:4 heavy recourse to off-balance-sheet 
accounting and creative accounting on the income statement 
contributed to the misuse of value for the benefit of a few 
executives. Astonishing as it sounds, this was not an isolated case. 
In the months that followed Enron’s collapse, massive scandals of 
listed companies in the U.S. succeeded each other. The 
telecommunications sector was hit especially hard by the 
bankruptcies of Qwest, Global Crossing and WorldCom. 
WorldCom’s June 2002 bankruptcy even surpassed Enron’s in scale 
($104 billion in assets, $41 billion in liabilities). But all sectors 
were involved. According to a report published by the General 
Accounting Office in October 2002, between January 1997 and 
June 2002, nearly 10% of listed companies in the U.S. restated 
their earnings at least once due to accounting irregularities. 
Moreover, a study conducted by the Huron group demonstrates 
that earnings restatements following financial irregularities are on 
the upswing:5 they reached a peak in 2004, with a total number of 
414. Ultimately, the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s 
witnessed a dramatic increase in financial irregularities.  
Recent decades have also witnessed a huge rise in executive 
compensation. According to Holmström and Kaplan (2003), overall 
CEO compensation increased by a factor of six during the 1980s 
and the 1990s. Most of this increase took the form of incentive 
pay—primarily stock options. This process has resulted in a 
deepening of intra-firm inequalities, of which the Business Week 
executive pay survey, regularly carried out, gives an idea: in 1980, 
the average income of CEOs of the largest firms in the U.S. was 40 
times the average salary of a worker. In 1990, it was 85 times 
higher, and in 2003, it jumped to 400 times higher. From a strict 
economic standpoint, such an increase raises serious concerns: it 
is hard to explain on the basis of incentive factors alone, despite 
                                            
4 The Powers Report (2002) remains the authoritative reference. See also Bratton 
(2002). 
5 Cited by Coffee (2005). 
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the effort made by some authors (see in particular Jensen and 
Murphy, 2004). Rather, a process of rent extraction by corporate 
managers seems to be at work here (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; 
Bratton, 2005). As such, this process can be considered alongside 
the wave of financial scandals and accounting irregularities. Both 
are the most visible marks of a structural phenomenon: a decline 
in corporate management accountability.  
The standard explanation of this phenomenon (at least of 
corporate scandals) points to the responsibility of the 
‘gatekeepers’. Coffee (2002) provides the most convincing outline 
of this thesis. The (external) auditors, who verify and certify 
companies’ accounts, and the financial analysts, who compile 
information in order to make buy-and-sell recommendations on 
securities, are those whose responsibility has been the most 
emphasised. This failure of auditors and analysts is explained, for a 
large part, by the conflicts of interest in these professions. For the 
auditors, the conflicts arose over the course of the 1990s as audit 
firms began to provide consulting services to their clients (other 
than auditing). Conflicts of interest are also presented as the 
mainspring of analysts’ misconduct: securities analysts most often 
work for investment banks offering advisory services to the 
corporations they analyse. 
Besides the gatekeepers’ dysfunctions, Enron-era scandals also 
revealed the weaknesses of the board of directors, as some 
commentators judiciously noted (see for example Gordon 2002). In 
the Enron case, independence did not prevent misbehaviour: at the 
end of 2001, Enron’s board included 12 ‘independent’ directors out 
of a total of 14. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA), promulgated in July 2002, was the 
explicit response to the loss of confidence in U.S. security 
markets. This text addresses two main issues. First, the SOA 
tightens the regulation of gatekeepers in order to limit conflicts of 
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interest. In particular, audit firms are forbidden from providing 
certain services to the companies they audit.6 Second, the SOA 
reaffirms the disciplinary role of the board of directors. The most 
significant rule concerns the audit committee. The Securities 
Exchange Commission is authorized to strike a company off the 
exchange if its audit committee is not entirely composed of 
independent members.7 
Despite increasingly virulent criticism, the subject of stock 
options is not even broached. In short, the SOA can be summed up 
as follows: shareholder primacy is good, but its monitoring system 
failed, mostly for incentive reasons. As a consequence, control 
mechanisms accountable to the shareholders must be 
strengthened. Yet this account might appear somewhat 
paradoxical. Indeed, it is incongruous that the governance model 
in the U.S.A., focused entirely on stacking up mechanisms of 
control for the last twenty years, failed so spectacularly in 
controlling corporate actors. This paradox might be expressed in 
more general terms: never have managers been as powerful, or at 
least as well-remunerated, as they have been since the alleged 
return in force of the shareholders. 
III. THE COGNITIVE ARGUMENT: SOME THEORY 
In this section, we offer a solution to the previous paradox by 
casting doubt on the effectiveness of shareholder primacy as an 
accountability-enhancing mechanism. To do so, we choose to rely 
                                            
6 Despite their ineffectiveness as gatekeepers from 1997 to 2001, securities 
analysts are the objects of fairly inconsequential clauses aimed principally at 
preventing conflicts of interest. 
7 Even if the text does not specifically anticipate the obligation to put an audit 
committee into place, it does specify that in the absence of such a committee, 
all clauses dealing with this committee (notably the independence of its 
members) must be applied to the board of directors as a whole. The constrictive 
character of this clause leads one to conclude that the majority of listed 
companies will create an audit committee. 
2007] SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY 11 
 
on three major theoretical contributions that join to stress the 
intrinsic limits of an external control on the business company, 
mostly for cognitive reasons. It is our argument that this idea may 
be found in the institutional perspectives of Berle and Means 
(1932) and Galbraith (1973) on one side and Alchian and Demsetz 
(1972) on the other side—beyond their yawning analytical 
divergences. 
A. BERLE AND MEANS (1932) AND GALBRAITH (1973): 
CORPORATE POWER AND KNOWLEDGE 
Few books have caused as much stir as The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property, written in 1932 by Berle and Means. These 
authors examined the way in which the rise to power of the stock 
company had affected private property, the main driving force of 
U.S. economic dynamics in the nineteenth century. From a survey 
of the 200 largest, non-financial corporations in the U.S. (presented 
in Book I), the two authors noted the following empirical fact: 
44% of firms were under managerial control. The ‘liberal 
conception of ownership’ (Honoré, 1961)—where the owner is both 
the beneficiary of the wealth created by the object owned and the 
sole person capable of transforming its substance—no longer 
applied to the real situation of shareholders. According to Berle 
and Means, shareholders of public corporations were just owners 
of an equity stake in a company. This ownership gave them 
certain rights, but it was no longer sufficient to provide 
shareholders with control of the company. In practical terms, 
therefore, the shareholders were no longer owners of firms. 
Book II was devoted to an analysis of the jurisprudence of the 
time. This analysis demonstrated that U.S. jurisprudence did not 
apprehend the full measure of the transformations presented in 
Book I. Thus, the U.S. judicial system continued to cling to the 
liberal, classical concept of ownership. The legal order therefore 
reaffirmed shareholder primacy. This revealed a certain lag in the 
legal order in relation to the social and economic reality, as well as 
underscoring the failure of the legal order to discipline corporate 
managers. Indeed, detailed analysis of the jurisprudence showed 
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that the stacking of legal measures, with the aim of ensuring 
shareholder control despite the dispersion of equity capital, was 
totally insufficient for restoring shareholder power:  
As the power of the corporate management has increased, and as 
the control of the individual has sunk into the background, the 
tendency of the law has been to stiffen its assertion of the rights of 
security holder. The thing that it has not been able to stiffen has 
been its regulation of the conduct of the business by the corporate 
management. And this omission has resulted, not from lack of 
logical justification, but from lack of ability to handle the 
problems involved. The management of an enterprise is, by nature, 
a task which courts can not assume; and the various devices by 
which management and control have absorbed a portion of the 
profit-stream have been so intimately related to the business 
conduct of an enterprise, that the courts seem to have felt not only 
reluctant to interfere, but positively afraid to do so (Berle and 
Means, 1932, p. 296). 
This quotation clarifies the reasons behind the legal system’s 
incapacity effectively to control the misappropriation of corporate 
wealth by managers: these misappropriations proceed, for the most 
part, from the very process of management itself. It is, for 
example, by choosing to take over a given firm or to invest in a 
given market that the executives increase their wealth and power 
at the expense of shareholders. Managers can always justify their 
choices by invoking industrial strategy, a justification that is 
practically impossible for the law to contest. And the reason is 
simple: courts are exterior to the firm as much as the shareholders 
concerned with preserving the liquidity of their shares. 
Ultimately, cases of pure embezzlement, objectively perceptible 
by the law (insider trading, for example, or misuse of corporate 
property), are relatively rare. This fact is at the root of the so-called 
‘business judgement rule’, according to which U.S. courts give 
managers broad discretion.  
This analysis of the courts’ structural inability to discipline 
managers did not attract much attention from subsequent 
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commentators, as compared to the free riding problem stemming 
from the dispersion of ownership. And yet it has profound insights 
for current debates on corporate governance. Not only did Berle 
and Means (1932) emphasise the difficulty for ‘liquid’ shareholders 
to control corporate executives; they also underlined the intrinsic 
limits of purely external control. Courts have the (legal) power to 
discipline corporate executives, but they lack reliable information 
to do so in a rational, effective manner. Because they are remote 
from day-to-day business conduct, courts lack the knowledge of 
business conduct, of the firm as a productive entity, necessary to 
monitor managerial behaviour. In fine, Berle and Means (1932) 
shed light on the cognitive limitations of courts as a corporate 
management control mechanism. 
This insight has been further developed by Galbraith (1973),8 who 
forcefully argues that the power of corporate insiders derives from, 
and is justified by, the informational advantage that they enjoy 
over liquid shareholders. Even to the limited extent that any 
shareholder or financial institution were sufficiently disposed to 
intervene from time to time in the operational affairs of the 
companies, any action that they took or demands that they made 
in this regard would be inherently irrational, given the inability of 
these `outsiders' to acquire sufficient information or expertise to 
be able accurately to pass judgement on the merits of managers' 
strategic decisions. According to Galbraith (1973), not only were 
shareholders physically detached from the day-to-day affairs of the 
business, but they were also excluded from the corporate 
‘technostructure’. The technostructure is defined as the collective 
body of corporate officers who, by virtue of the supremacy that 
they enjoyed over the base of scientific and technical skills, 
knowledge and expertise upon which the company's operations 
were dependent, enjoyed the exclusive capacity to command 
strategic control over all business affairs. In other words, Galbraith 
believed that, in the modern corporate economy, where operations 
                                            
8 I would like to thank Marc Moore for this reference. 
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were increasingly technical and specialised in nature, the ‘real’ 
power within the large company rested with those that possessed 
the relevant knowledge, rather than the wealth, that comprised 
the business, thereby excluding shareholders from the realm of 
effective corporate control.  
B. ALCHIAN AND DEMSETZ (1972): TEAM PRODUCTION AND 
LIQUID SHAREHOLDERS 
The parallel between Berle and Means and Galbraith is hardly a 
surprise, given the intellectual proximity between them. However, 
it is probably more unusual to bring together Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972) with the authors of The Modern Corporation. 
Indeed Alchian and Demsetz laid down the basic foundations of 
the contractarian approach, which was later to constitute the main 
critic of the stakeholder approach to corporate governance, often 
associated with Berle and Means. However, and somewhat 
paradoxically, Alchian and Demsetz’s argument is at odds with 
the principle of shareholder primacy. The originality of their 
contribution, inside the contractarian approach, is related to their 
specific focus on the productive dimension of intra-firm 
coordination. 
More precisely, Alchian and Demsetz (1972) argue that much of 
the productive process involves ‘team production’: by definition, 
team production occurs whenever overall output (y) is greater than 
the sum of individual contributions or investments (ei, i=1, …, n), 
due to the complementarities of human assets. The production 
function is then nonseparable:  
y = y (e1 ;… ; en) , with ijee
y
ji
≠>∂∂
∂ ,0
2
 
Team production has two major implications. On the one hand, it 
implies that the individuals involved in the team produce 
“organizational” rent, as a result of a specific combination of 
assets (here, mainly human assets). On the other hand, it is hard to 
attribute any particular portion of the gains to any particular 
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member’s contribution. Yet in a standard, neo-classical 
framework, allocative efficiency recommends that individual 
retribution should equal individual marginal productivity: 
otherwise, free riding occurs. The crux of the problem is then the 
following: how can one profit from the synergy gains made 
possible by team production when individual contributions cannot 
easily be inferred from the output? Alchian and Demsetz (1972) 
add a crucial assumption: individual productivity may be inferred 
not from the observation of output (that is from outside), but from 
the observation of individual behaviour (that is from inside). And 
this inference is made easier for an individual who has, prior to the 
production process, assigned and dictated jobs.  
In these conditions, the solution put forward by Alchian and 
Demsetz is to select a supervision (monitoring) specialist at the 
head of the team. The specialist’s role is to oversee how the 
individuals perform (right 1) in order to come to a precise 
evaluation of their marginal productivity and thus to adapt their 
remuneration accordingly. To ease this supervision function, the 
right to assign and dictate jobs to the other members of the team is 
given to the monitor (right 2). If this latter performs his or her task 
well, each of the members will be rewarded for their marginal 
productivity and an efficient allocation attained. The appropriate 
incentive measure in this case is to make the monitor the residual 
beneficiary of the team (right 3). Beyond the right to supervise (1), 
to assign tasks and to organise production (2), and to obtain the 
residual gains (3), Alchian and Demsetz grant the specialist the 
right to resell the preceding rights (right 4). Finally, Alchian and 
Demsetz stress the exact correspondence between their central 
agent and the owner of the capitalist firm as the latter is 
traditionally defined. And this is precisely how they demonstrate 
the efficiency of the capitalist firm, born from the desire to profit 
from the synergy gains of team production, all the while avoiding 
the incentive problems raised by this type of activity. 
Yet we would argue that the very structure of their model is in 
contradiction to the principle of shareholder primacy. To see this, 
one should note that authority (i.e. the right to assign tasks and to 
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organise production) and residual claim are allocated to the central 
agent because he is the supervisor. It is because he is in charge of 
supervising (right 1) that he is granted the power to decide who 
should do what (right 2) and the residual income (right 3). This is 
exactly the opposite of the traditional economic argument (see 
supra), where the ultimate authority is given to the stakeholders 
who bear the risk (namely the stockholders). In Alchian and 
Demsetz, risk-bearing is backed onto control and supervision. The 
crucial point is that the supervising function cannot be exercised, 
by definition, outside the team (the firm). Being part of the team 
(an insider) induces a specific knowledge about the origin of profit 
(organizational rent), and this knowledge lies at the very 
foundation of authority and power. Any attempt to empower 
liquid shareholders therefore comes up against this cognitive 
issue: authority should, by definition, be located inside the firm as 
a productive entity.  
In sum, focusing on team production leads to reservations—to say 
the least—about shareholder primacy, an original standpoint 
within the contractarian paradigm.9 The following quotation, 
where Alchian and Demsetz tend to minimise the role of 
shareholders, should not come as a surprise: 
Instead of thinking of shareholders as joint owners, we 
can think of them as investors, like bondholders, except 
that the stockholders are more optimistic than 
bondholders about the enterprise prospects. […] The 
residual claim on earnings enjoyed by shareholders does 
not serve the function of enhancing their efficiency as 
monitors in the general situation. The stockholders are 
‘merely’ the less risk-averse or the more optimistic 
members of the group that finances the firm. […]  [So] 
why should stockholders be regarded as ‘owners’ in any 
                                            
9 But note that Blair and Stout (1999) or Kaufman and Englander (2005) develop a 
similar argument. 
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sense distinct from the other financial investors? The 
entrepreneur-organizer, who let us assume is the chief 
operating officer and sole repository of control of the 
corporation, does not find his authority residing in 
common stockholders (except in the case of a take over). 
[…]  In sum, is it the case that the stockholder […] 
relationship is one emanating from the division of 
ownership among several people, or is it that the 
collection of investment funds from people of varying 
anticipations is the underlying factor? If the latter, why 
should any of them be thought of as the owners in whom 
voting rights, whatever they may signify or however 
exercisable, should reside in order to enhance efficiency? 
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972, p. 789) 
In this section, we have sought to show that Berle and Means 
(1932), Galbraith (1973) and Alchian and Demsetz (1972) share a 
common argument, despite their obvious methodological and 
theoretical divergences: they all stress the specificity of the 
productive activity—the source of corporate profit as an 
organizational quasi-rent—and the intrinsic limitations on the 
evaluation of this activity by outsiders. In this context, 
shareholder primacy attempts to empower those stakeholders 
whose firm-specific knowledge is the least developed. As such, the 
implementation of shareholder primacy implies a partial 
disconnection between access to internal knowledge and 
empowerment. This disconnection raises serious concern: those 
vested with ultimate control rights and whose interests are 
supposed to be served (shareholders) are intrinsically limited in 
their ability to assess corporate activity. Control of managerial 
accountability is fully exteriorized, increasing the opportunity for 
fraudulent behaviour. The next section provides empirical 
evidence to support this argument, taken from the massive post-
bubble corporate financial scandals: in particular, we illustrate the 
limits of the monitoring devices upon which a shareholder-
oriented model relies.  
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IV. THE COGNITIVE ARGUMENT: SOME EVIDENCE 
In this section, we successively consider the case of the two sets of 
supervisory actors who are, in a shareholder-oriented model of 
corporate governance, in charge of reducing informational 
asymmetries between insiders and shareholders: directors and 
external gatekeepers. 
A. THE CASE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
According to institutional investors as well as proponents of 
shareholder primacy, the raison d’être of this internal organ is to 
control the managerial team on behalf of distant stockholders. 
Following this line, independence—as a way to prevent collusion 
between the controllers (board members) and the controlled 
(managers)—came to be a cornerstone of corporate governance 
reforms. The difficulty is that it is hard to give a precise content to 
the concept of independence. Yet institutional investors need clear 
signs, visible from a distance. Among these signs, the absence of 
relationships with management is favoured. But as Roberts, 
McNulty and Stiles (2005) note, such an approach to independence 
tends to limit the involvement and commitment of non-executive 
directors in corporate affairs. In turn, this means a rather weak 
knowledge of the firm and of its productive and commercial 
dynamics. The assessment of the board of directors offered by the 
doctrine of shareholder primacy is therefore paradoxical in that it 
advocates an increasing exteriority for this internal mode of 
control. As argued before, this exteriority reduces the effectiveness 
of the board as a control mechanism. But it is even more damaging 
for its strategic role, which remains—contrary to the claim of the 
agency theorists—an essential part of the job.10  
                                            
10 For a critique of this exclusive focus on the control role of the board, and more 
broadly of the agency approach to the board, see the special issue of the British 
Journal of Management, vol. 16 and, in particular, Roberts, McNulty and Stiles 
(2005) and Huse (2005). 
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The in-depth study conducted by Roberts et al. (2005) 
demonstrates that if independence is a crucial feature for non-
executive directors, it should be understood as a ‘willingness to 
exercise independence of mind in relation to executive strategy 
and performance’ (p. 19). And this willingness is only possible if 
the directors’ knowledge about the company and its management 
is strong enough. Accordingly, as Roberts et al. (2005) logically 
conclude: ‘[…] the advocacy by institutional investors, policy 
advisors and the business media of greater non-executive 
independence may be too crude or even counter-productive’ (p. 19). 
Consequently, it should come as no surprise that performance 
studies have failed to reveal any relationship between board 
composition and firm performance. Worse, some studies suggest 
that there may be a damaging influence of independent directors: 
Fernandes (2005), for example, finds for listed Portuguese 
companies that executive compensation increases with the 
number of independent directors and that the relationship 
between this compensation and firm performance is stronger in 
firms with no independent board members. 
Considering the case of the high profile corporate scandals, we find 
clear evidence that the lack of reliable knowledge by independent 
directors was one of the driving forces behind control failure. As 
already mentioned, Enron’s board contained 12 independent 
directors out of a total of 14, in the last months. Their 
incompetence appears to be more striking than their dishonesty. 
The case of the LJMs (LJM1 and LJM2)—private investment funds 
created at the instigation of Enron’s executives—and the Raptors 
is a conspicuous example. The objective of the four Raptor 
operations, initiated in June 2000, was to hide losses related to 
depreciated investments. Approximately $1 billion in losses was 
transferred in this way. A Special Purpose Entity (SPE), intended to 
receive the assets that Enron wanted to hedge, was created for 
each operation (Raptor I, II, III and IV). Each time, funding of the 
SPE came from two sources: a contribution from Enron in the 
form of pledges of Enron stock and call options, and $30 million in 
liquid assets from LJM2. LJM2’s investment was nevertheless 
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accompanied by a commitment to repay within six months with a 
premium of $11 million (to make a total reimbursement of $41 
million). Consequently, Enron stock was the only tangible capital 
that the Raptors had for hedging Enron assets. In short, Enron 
‘hedged’ itself, counter to all financial logic. The board of directors 
was informed of all these transactions. But instead of worrying, 
the board appeared to be quite enthusiastic. Thus, we learn in the 
Report of the U.S. Senate on “The role of the board of directors in 
Enron’s collapse” (2002) that one of the board members suggested 
that Enron’s Chief Financial Officer (CFO) file “a patent” on the 
accounting techniques used in the Raptor operations (p.21, note 
47). Later, in his hearing with the Senate Committee, this director 
would qualify the Raptor operation as ‘leading hedge accounting’ 
(p. 20). All in all, LJM2’s first six months of business brought 
Enron a profit of $200 million. As the US Senate Report notes, 
‘…[no] Directors asked how LJM was able to produce such huge 
funds flow with such minimal effort by [Enron’s CFO]’ (p. 33).  
This lack of understanding of what was going on inside the firm by 
non-executive board members might be contrasted with the 
reaction of Enron’s employees. Employees, by definition, have 
access to specific and tacit knowledge, the foundation of effective 
monitoring. In particular, one employee, Sherron Watkins—vice 
president of corporate development—was aware of the extent of 
fraudulent behaviour. However, she did not have any formal right 
to express her concerns publicly. She feared for her job and so 
decided to write an anonymous letter to Kenneth Lay (Enron 
CEO), concluding: ‘We’re such a crooked company’. This story 
reveals an important aspect of the internal balance of power in US 
corporations, and in the shareholder-friendly model in general 
(Windolf, 2004): the lack of internal countervailing powers. The 
US model of corporate governance does not grant any rights to 
sustain the voice of non-shareholder constituencies, and in 
particular the workers. This marks a major difference with the 
European continental model, characterized by worker involvement 
in corporate governance (Rebérioux 2002): as a constituent 
element, workers have the right to be informed and consulted 
about the main issues in the functioning of the firm. Possibly, 
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they may be granted a power of co-determination on a more or less 
wide range of subjects, through elected representatives. Through 
these rights, managers are induced (or forced) to take the interests 
of employees into account when making their decisions. 
Corporate governance is directly affected: these rights to 
information, consultation and co-determination contribute, when 
they exist, to the definition of a specific aim for the exercise of 
power within companies, in which the maximization of the well-
being of shareholders is not taken to be the required norm. But 
there is more: worker involvement provides at least some internal 
countervailing powers. This is evident in the case of 
codetermination in the form of board-level participation (on the 
supervisory board, as in Germany, or on the board of directors, as 
in Sweden). But it is true for the information and consultation 
rights granted to works councils. From this point of view, France 
is a good example. Article L.431 of the Labour Code, for example, 
requires the employer to provide the works council with the 
information it may wish to obtain on the general functioning of 
the company. This information plays an important role in the ex 
post control, conducted by judges, of the legal validity of economic 
lay-offs. Another important right is the possibility for the works 
council to call in an expert accountant, in order to obtain a 
counter-valuation of the information communicated by the 
employer. As Grumbach (1995) notes, this right challenges the 
‘employer’s monopoly on legitimate expertise’.11 
B. THE CASE OF EXTERNAL GATEKEEPERS 
It is now widely accepted that conflicts of interest—in particular 
for external auditors and securities analysts—did play a role in the 
failure of gatekeepers during the Enron-era financial scandals. 
                                            
11 On some aspects, the information rights enjoyed by the work council are even 
greater than those of shareholders: for example, managers must inform worker 
representatives (and not the shareholders) whenever the trade of a block holding 
is expected. 
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However, it is part of our argument that the failure of these 
gatekeepers cannot be reduced solely to this dimension. Even 
when it is carefully performed, gatekeeper control cannot 
supervise the whole process of profit formation inside the firm. 
This argument is clear-cut in the case of rating agencies and 
financial analysts, who rely mainly on publicly available 
information. It is their processing of this information that proves 
useful for investors. But this can hardly be enough to define them 
as watchdogs of corporate activity12. The following quotation by 
Leo C. O'Neill, President of Standard and Poor's illustrates this 
point: 
Obviously S&P and the other rating agencies were 
evaluating Enron, so it was fair enough to include us. My 
view is that the [Senate Governmental Affairs 
Committee's] report ascribed a watchdog role to S&P 
that no one, including us, ever intended S&P to have. 
That's not our job. We are recipients of the information 
that is generated by the companies, approved by their 
auditors, and sanctioned by their legal counsel. We 
believe we have every right to rely on the disclosures 
they make to the SEC. We also, as you know, meet with 
companies and ask them a lot of questions. But quite 
honestly, they have absolutely no obligation to disclose 
to us. And we have no right to impose any kind of 
sanctions or legal constraints [to make them disclose]’ 
(CFO Magazine January 1, 2003).  
The same comment might apply to securities analysts. The 
cognitive limitations of these actors—combined with their 
influence on stock price determination—form the basis of the 
assumption of a ‘cognitive bias’. Moreton and Zenger (2004) have 
                                            
12 For a radical academic view, see Partnoy (2001), who considers that “credit 
ratings are of scant informational value” (p.1). I would like to thank Ludovic 
Moreau for this reference. 
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set up this hypothesis in the case of securities analysts. 
Specifically, they test the proposition that analysts discount 
‘unfamiliar (corporate) strategies’, which combine assets from a 
priori unrelated business. These cross-sector strategies are, by 
definition, difficult for analysts to understand. Accordingly, the 
more diversified a firm is, the less it will be covered by analysts. In 
turn, one may argue that stock price evaluation is positively 
correlated with the number of analysts covering the firm. The 
conclusion is that securities analysts tend to restrain managerial 
strategy, in favour of ‘familiar’ strategies… that are not necessarily 
profit-maximizing. Indeed, it is a persistent message of 
organisational theory and resource-based theory of the firm that 
the production and preservation of organizational rent are closely 
related to business models favouring the original combination of 
assets. As a general principle, the growing role of knowledge and 
intangible assets in rent production widens the gap between the 
gatekeepers’ evaluation and the reality of the business firm, 
leading to a deepening of cognitive bias.  
Even in the case of auditors, more closely connected to the firm 
than rating agencies and financial analysts, we may cast doubt on 
the proposition that their failure is solely due to (remediable) 
conflicts of interest. For sure, the auditors’ assessment is partly 
based on private information and on-going relations with 
executive officers. For this reason, rating agencies and analysts 
regularly complain that they are at the end of the ‘informational 
chain’, laying responsibility for the high-profile corporate scandals 
mainly at the door of the auditors. However, the power of auditors, 
their ability to monitor corporate managers and to detect deviant 
behaviour, should not be over-estimated. The following extract, by 
Mary Locatelli—former executive vice president and director of 
audit at American Savings Bank—is instructive: ‘External auditors 
focus after the fact on a distinct event (a set of financial 
statements) and ask the question ‘What, if anything, went wrong?’’ 
(CPA Journal, October 2002). Thus, audit firms provide for an ex 
post, rather than ex ante, monitoring activity. This is to be 
contrasted with internal auditors, who ‘focus on an ongoing 
process and assess risks and controls to answer the question ‘What 
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could go wrong?’’ Locatelli then concludes: ‘Outsiders are not 
insiders […]. A lack of appreciation and understanding leads 
companies to leave controls to outside experts’.  
To conclude, the information used by stock markets to evaluate 
business conduct and performance is produced by actors that are, 
by their very nature, at a distance from the productive process. As 
such, they suffer from intrinsic cognitive limitations. Reliable 
knowledge about the business firm is to be acquired, in a large 
part, inside the firm as a productive entity combining specific 
competences and tacit knowledge. By trying to empower liquid 
investors, shareholder primacy contributes to ‘externalize’ the 
sources of information about and control of business conduct. As 
such, it undermines its effectiveness as an accountability-
enhancing arrangement. 
V. MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOUR UNDER SHAREHOLDER 
PRIMACY 
The argument developed so far helps to explain the opportunity for 
fraudulent behaviours under shareholder primacy. However, to 
understand how those behaviours become effective, we need to 
appreciate more clearly the constraint imposed on business 
conduct through the stock markets. Essentially, the power of 
financial markets is expressed by the imposition of constraining 
criteria of financial returns. The competition among investment 
funds to attract collective savings is transferred onto the 
companies, which are judged by these funds on the basis of their 
ability to meet the financial demands imposed on them. This 
power is conferred by stock market liquidity, which allows a 
continuous process of public evaluation of companies (Orléan, 
1999; Deakin, 2005). 
An analysis of the implications of the most popular ‘Value-Based 
Management’ tool—Economic Value Added (EVA)—may prove to 
be particularly useful: indeed, this metric condenses the logic of 
(stock) market control over listed companies. The first function of 
EVA is informational: it is considered to be the most relevant 
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criterion for the prediction of stock market prices. The second 
function is operational: EVA is set down as the management 
criterion for executives, who must seek to maximize the 
difference between financial profitability (the return on equity) 
and the cost of capital (see infra). The latter is no longer 
considered as a consequence of the firm's productive and 
commercial operations, determined ex post. Rather, the cost of 
capital is considered as a benchmark in itself, determined ex ante. 
The use of benchmarking thus provides financial investors with 
the ability to undertake a continuous and generalised comparison 
between listed companies. 
The assumption that there are no tax deductions or exceptional 
results simplifies the calculation, so that the current result merges 
with the net result. Let us denote Ro the operating result, D the 
book value of debts, r their average costs, EC the book value of 
equity capital, k the equilibrium return on equity capital as 
determined by the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)13 and K 
the total book value of the assets (D + EC). Then it is possible to 
obtain the following expressions for the net result (R) and the 
weighted average capital cost (WACC): 
R = Ro - r.D       (1) 
WACC = k. EC / K + r. D / K = k - (k - r).D/K  (2) 
The simplest expression of a company’s EVA is then the following: 
EVA = R - k.EC       (3) 
MVA is defined as the discounted total (using the WACC) of 
excepted EVA. By denoting ROE the return on equity (R / EC) and 
                                            
13 The CAPM, developed in the 1960s (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965), permits the 
calculation of the premium which rational investors expect for holding risky 
assets (with high volatility).  
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ROA the return on assets (R / K), expression (3) can be rewritten 
as: 
EVA = (ROE - k).EC = (ROA - WACC).K  (4) 
Equation (3) brings out the specific nature of EVA: while the 
wealth going to shareholders is normally measured by net return 
(R, that is the profit once the employees have been paid and the 
debts serviced), the EVA indicator is based on the idea that the 
value actually created for shareholders is anything in excess of the 
profitability demanded by the capital market (k.EC). In other 
words, if the effective return on investment (the ROE) is the rate 
k, which corresponds to the equilibrium market return for that 
class of risk, then the EVA model considers that no value has been 
created (see 4). Likewise, if the investment is ultimately 
remunerated at a rate n with 0 < n < k, then there is destruction of 
value: there is some return on investment, but less than the 
market has the right to expect. The difference is identified as a 
loss, even if shareholders are paid for their investment. The 
market return at equilibrium (k) becomes a minimal return or an 
opportunity cost, ‘always to be exceeded’ (Batsch, 1999, p. 36). 
This has two far-reaching consequences. 
On the one hand, the systematization of the EVA model results in 
a profound modification of the status of shareholders. As Lordon 
(2000) notes, creation of value means that shareholders are paid 
twice: once at the opportunity cost k and again at the EVA. 
Through the EVA, residual creditors therefore become privileged 
creditors, as if they were lenders. They acquire guarantees of 
returns on their investments (k) and although these guarantees are 
not contractual, they do constrain managerial strategies14. This 
                                            
14 On this point, see for more details Froud, Haslam, Johal and Williams (2000). 
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change, it should be noted, further undermines the traditional 
economic justification for shareholder sovereignty: risk-taking15. 
On the other hand, the creation of shareholder value originates in 
a logic of imbalance transformed into a permanent objective. The 
macro-economic inconsistency of this principle is obvious: not all 
the (listed) companies can create value for their shareholders, 
whatever the quality of their management. At the micro-economic 
level, methods for doping financial returns beyond what the 
companies’ economic potential would permit are sustained by 
elevated stock-exchange prices. These methods combine the 
increase of the debt-to-equity ratio (financial leverage), the asset-
light strategy and the repurchase of shares. If the interest rate r is 
below k, an increase in the debt-to-equity ratio reduces the WACC 
(see equation 2) and thus raises the EVA (see 4). The asset light 
strategy (∆ K < 0) automatically raises the return on assets (ROA), 
while the repurchase of shares increases the return on equity 
(ROE). Both result in a rise in the EVA (see equation 4). All of 
these methods were extensively used by Enron’s officers. Clearly, 
none of them are sustainable over the medium-to-long term. 
These are short-term strategies with the aim of generating 
financial returns beyond the market equilibrium. As such, they are 
highly risky and encourage bold innovations flaunting acceptable 
standards of caution. 
Let us sum up our main argument. If capital markets have 
increased their ability to obtain results (in terms of financial 
return), they are limited in their ability to appreciate the way in 
which these requirements are met. This contributes to making 
managerial power less accountable: financial irregularities 
multiply and executive remunerations explode. Shareholder 
                                            
15 In the introduction, we emphasised a complementary argument, implying that 
shareholders are not the unique risk-bearer in the firm: the growth of human 
capital specificity in a context of contractual incompleteness. 
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primacy fails exactly where it strives to succeed: it reinforces the 
discretionary power of managers rather than limiting it. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Share prices are fundamentally perceptions of value. The primary 
concern of managers accountable solely to the shareholders is 
therefore to influence these perceptions. Accordingly, the crucial 
question is the information upon which these perceptions are 
formed. We have argued that in a market-based model of corporate 
governance, this information is essentially produced by outsiders. 
In the context of a liquid stock market, monitoring by investors 
through long-term block holding is not feasible. In addition, and 
by definition, workers are out of the game: it is hard to ask them 
to monitor managers to ensure the latter create value for 
shareholders. Yet it is a relentless message of organizational 
theory that the wealth creation process and corporate profits are 
part of a complex cognitive dynamics hardly observable at a 
distance—an insight we can trace back to Berle and Means (1932), 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) or Galbraith (1973). The revival of 
non-contractarian, cognitive-based theories of the firm—with the 
resource-based approach or evolutionary theory—should reinforce 
the scepticism towards shareholder primacy (see for example 
O’Sullivan, 2000A and 2000B; Grandori, 2004; Aglietta and 
Rebérioux, 2005). Indeed, cognitive approaches explore the way in 
which the firm constructs, maintains and develops tacit and 
collective productive knowledge. The competitiveness of the firm 
then depends on the quality of this ‘cognitive’ process, that is to 
say a process of collective (organizational) learning. The fact that 
such an approach leads to a rejection of shareholder primacy 
should come as no surprise. 
Besides the intrinsic limitations of shareholder primacy in 
generating an effective supervising environment, we have stressed 
another crucial feature of finance-led capitalism: the power of 
capital markets is expressed through the definition of ex ante 
financial requirements, which lead corporate executives to pursue 
highly risky strategies. Weak control on one side and strong 
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pressure on the other: taken together, these features create a 
highly favourable configuration for fraudulent behaviours. Hence 
the paradox: the greater the implementation of shareholder 
sovereignty, the less corporate executives are effectively 
accountable. In other words, it is our argument that instability is 
an inherent defect of shareholder primacy. 
Some perennial questions in the field of corporate governance and 
corporate law are observable. Managerial accountability is one of 
these—if not the most important. As Cheffins (2004) notes, there 
is something cyclical about this issue, which casts doubts on the 
idea that corporate law and, more broadly, the theory of the firm is 
on a constant progressive trend. From this point of view, new 
developments in the theory of the firm, together with the current 
evolution in corporate practices and business conduct, may well 
deeply influence the way corporate accountability is understood— 
after long domination by the shareholder primacy principle. 
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